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The Walker Process Doctrine: 





Any patent holder, including a monopolist, may challenge an 
infringement of its patent or other IP rights. Of course, defending the 
infringement suit may prove costly to the alleged infringer.  Further, if 
the latter's product is itself the alleged infringement, the patentee 
acting in good faith is entitled to notify the infringer's customers.1  
Customers using infringing articles may themselves be contributory 
infringers2 and may therefore require indemnification security from 
the infringement defendant or if sufficiently frightened may stop 
dealing altogether. Subjecting a potential or actual rival to such 
burdens may weaken it or even dissuade it from beginning or 
continuing its rivalry with the monopolist patentee -- and perhaps 
without regard to the merits of the infringement claim. 
 
 As a result, suing on a patent in bad faith -- for example, 
where the patent was wrongfully obtained or the patentee knows that 
the rival is not an infringer -- is "exclusionary" in the '2 sense.  
Further, since improperly motivated litigation in this sense is a 
"sham," neither is it protected by the Noerr doctrine.3 
 
 To summarize: 
                                                 
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. 
 
     1E.g., Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
1999);  Super Prods Corp. v. D P Way Corp., 546 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1976); Deltec 
v. Laster, 326 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1964); Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co. v. Task Force Tips, 
Inc., 867 F.Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind. 1994).  See also PennPac Intern., Inc. v. Rotonics 
Mfg., Inc., 2001 WL 569264 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (similar; absent bad faith the federal 
right to notify potential infringer's customers preempts state tort claims arising out 
of the notifications).  Contrast Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 
1200-1203 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983) (harassing rivals' 
customers concerning pending infringement litigation not protected). 
     235 U.S.C. '271(a). 
     3See 1 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law Ch. 2A (3d 
ed. 2006) (hereinafter "Antitrust Law"). 
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$  In Walker Process the Supreme Court declared that an 
infringement lawsuit based on a patent that was 
acquired by "fraud" could be the basis for an 
infringement defendant's antitrust lawsuit against the 
infringement plaintiff.4  This lawsuit most typically 
proceeds by way of counterclaim to the infringement 
suit; but the courts have also approved the submission 
of Walker Process claims in declaratory judgment 
actions and even in primary lawsuits filed under the 
Sherman Act.5 
 
$  In today's parlance "fraud" most typically refers to 
"inequitable conduct" by the applicant during the patent 
application process.  But not every imperfection in a 
patent application process is sufficient to make a patent 
unenforceable.  The Federal Circuit has set high 
standards for inequitable conduct, which require an 
actual intent to deceive the patent examiner and a 
showing of "materiality," which means that the 
examiner would very likely not have issued the patent 
had he or she known the truth.  That court has set even 
higher standards for establishing that a lawsuit on such 
a patent constitutes an antitrust violation. 
 
$  The realm of exclusionary practices regarding patent 
claims is broader than inequitable conduct, however, 
and covers any assertion of an IP right to exclude 
others while knowing that the IP right in question is 
unenforceable under the circumstances.  The antitrust 
conduct can consist of such things as: (1) filing an 
infringement suit on a patent that the patentee knew or 
should have known was unenforceable as a result of 
inequitable conduct or other imperfections in the 
application process; (2) filing of an infringement suit 
when the infringement plaintiff knew or should have 
known that the rival's technology did not infringe; (3) 
                                                 
     4Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 
172 (1965). 
     5See discussion infra. 
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filing an infringement suit based on an expired patent.  
The '2 claim can also be based on exclusionary 
actions other than the filing of an infringement suit, 
such as threats to sue, writing letters to the rival's 
customers threatening them with contributory 
infringement actions while knowing that no infringement 
is taking place, and the like. 
 
$  The antitrust conduct under '2 is an "exclusionary" 
practice, and as such must be evaluated as of the time 
it is asserted.  The relevant question is whether the 
patentee knew or should have known at the time it filed 
its lawsuit or took other exclusionary action that the IP 
right being asserted was invalid or unenforceable in the 
particular situation.  The conduct before the PTO is 
often relevant but does not necessarily determine the 
antitrust claim.  We believe that the conduct should be 
evaluated by objective criteria. 
 
$  In all cases involving '2 the conduct must be 
reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging 
monopoly power by impairing the opportunities of 
rivals.6  This entails that the exclusionary force of the 
conduct must be evaluated for its effect on price and 
output in a properly defined antitrust market.  Often this 
will require the tribunal to assess the exclusionary 
power of the improperly asserted patent itself; however, 
in a monopoly maintenance case it may be sufficient to 
show that the infringement plaintiff has a dominant 
market share in the business from which exclusion of 
the rival is threatened.  When such power or 
competitive effects are lacking, the person targeted by 
a bad faith IP claim may have a state law tort action for 
fraud or malicious prosecution. 
 
Fraud, inequitable conduct, and other improprieties 
 
 Wrongfully brought infringement actions can be based on 
fraudulently obtained patents, and in those cases the fraud or 
                                                 
     6See 3 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &651a (3d 
ed. 2008). 
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inequitable conduct in obtaining the patent establishes the 
impropriety of the subsequent infringement action -- one who acted 
fraudulently in obtaining a patent necessarily knows its patent is 
unenforceable.7  But infringement actions can also be qualifying 
exclusionary practices under '2 when they are based on valid 
patents that are known by the infringement plaintiff to be 
unenforceable as a result of improprieties in procurement, or on valid 
patents but where the infringement plaintiff knew or should have 
known that the infringement defendant was not an infringer.8  
Wrongfulness can also be established when the infringement plaintiff 
bases its cause of action on unreasonable and clearly incorrect 
interpretations of questions of law.  For example, an action for 
contributory infringement is proper against one who sells a nonstaple 
good under circumstances where the buyer of the good must infringe 
the patent in order to make use of the good.9  But an action against 
the manufacturer of a staple good with numerous non-infringing uses 
would be clearly contrary to law and thus presumably brought in bad 
                                                 
     7Of course, principles of res judicata apply.  See Abbott Laboratories v. 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75617 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 23, 2007) 
(infringement defendant/counterclaimant adequately alleged Walker Process 
violation; while the court could take judicial notice of another decision finding that 
patentee had not engaged in inequitable conduct before PTO [Abbott v. Torpharm, 
2006 WL 2458717 (N. D. Ill. 2004)], Mylan was not a party to that litigation and 
thus the facts found there were not dispositive as to it; citing GE Capital Corp. v. 
Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 1997) (a court "cannot 
achieve through judicial notice what it cannot achieve through collateral estoppel" 
when the plaintiff in a subsequent action was not a party to the previous action and 
"has never been afforded an opportunity to present its evidence and arguments on 
the claim")). 
     8See, e.g., United States v. Besser Mfg. Co., 96 F.Supp. 304, 312 (E.D.Mich. 
1951), aff'd 343 U.S. 444 (1952) (lawsuits on machine alleged to infringe but that 
patentee had never examined); Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. International Nutrition Co., 
175 F. Supp. 2d 296, 313-314 (D. Conn. 2001) (antitrust claim survived motion to 
dismiss where it alleged that defendant's prior patent infringement action was 
objectively baseless because it did not reasonably have ownership of the patent in 
question).  Suits for contributory infringement against those making products 
complementary to the patented product could also qualify as exclusionary 
practices.  Such suits are authorized in 35 U.S.C. '271(d); '271(c) of that statute 
defines contributory infringement. 
     9For the definition of contributory infringement and further explanation, see 
10 Phillip E. Areeda, Einer Elhauge and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 
&1781b (2d ed. 2003). 
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faith.10 
 
 The important difference between infringement actions based 
on fraudulently procured patents and other improper infringement 
actions is that for the latter the conduct in obtaining the patent does 
not in and of itself establish impropriety.  It must additionally be 
established that the enforcer knew or should have known at the time 
of bringing the suit that the patent was unenforceable under the 
circumstances in question.  Nevertheless, this difference is readily 
exaggerated.  The all important question in either circumstance is 
whether the patentee has (1) committed an exclusionary act that is 
(2) not authorized by the patent law. 
 
 The exclusionary act is most generally a patent infringement 
suit, or in some cases another assertion of the patent's exclusionary 
power.  As a result the wrongfulness of the act must be assessed as 
of the time it is asserted.  As a general proposition, merely obtaining 
a patent by fraud, with no subsequent enforcement attempt, is not an 
exclusionary practice under '2.11  Once the infringement action is 
filed the relevant question becomes whether the infringement plaintiff 
knew or should have known that the action is improper, and this can 
result from any deficiency including but not limited to fraud or 
inequitable conduct before the PTO. 
 
 Typically, but not always, the antitrust claim is a compulsory 
counterclaim to the underlying infringement suit.  First, the patentee 
files its infringement action.  Then, the infringement defendant12 
answers that the asserted patent is invalid or unenforceable under 
the circumstances, or that the infringement defendant's technology 
                                                 
     10See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980); 
and 35 U.S.C. '271(c), whose provision on contributory infringement expressly 
excludes "a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial non-
infringing use...." 
     11See Cygnus Therapeutic Systems v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir. 
1996).  On the possibility of a proceeding under the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, see 3 Antitrust Law &705c (3d ed. 2008). 
     12To simplify the exposition this Paragraph uses the terms "infringement 
plaintiff" and "infringement defendant" to refer to the original parties to an 
infringement action; and "antitrust plaintiff" and "antitrust defendant" to refer to the 
parties with respect to the antitrust countersuit. 
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does not infringe. In addition, the infringement defendant 
counterclaims, alleging that the unwarranted infringement action is 
itself monopolization or an attempt to monopolize a market covered 
by or related to the patent in question. 
 
 In Nobelpharma13 the Federal Circuit explored the relationship 
between the Supreme Court's Professional Real Estate (PRE) 
decision14 and its earlier Walker Process conclusion15 that obtaining 
a patent by fraud and then attempting to enforce it could constitute 
an antitrust violation.  The infringement plaintiff had filed suit on a 
patent that was found to be invalid for failure to disclose the best 
mode for carrying out an invention.  The main purpose of this 
requirement is to permit those examining the patent to learn the best 
mode for applying the invention without undue experimentation, thus 
facilitating the entry of the innovation into the public domain once the 
patent expires.  In this case the Swedish patentee had additional 
information about the best mode for carrying out its invention, but 
that information was not disclosed and did not appear in the 
application for a United States patent.  The jury concluded from this 
evidence that the patent had been obtained by fraud.16 
 
 The court indicated that antitrust liability for an improperly 
brought patent infringement suit can be established by one of two 
alternative routes: 
 
 A patentee who brings an infringement suit may be subject to 
antitrust liability for the anti-competitive effects of that suit if 
the alleged infringer (the antitrust plaintiff) proves (1) that the 
asserted patent was obtained through knowing and willful 
fraud within the meaning of Walker Process ..., or (2) that the 
infringement suit was "a mere sham to cover what is actually 
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the 
                                                 
     13Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 876 (1998) (vacating and withdrawing the previous panel opinion 
published at 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
     14See Prof'l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 
U.S. 49 (1993) ("PRE"). 
     15See note 4. 
     16Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1062. 
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business relationships of a competitor...."17 
 
 The court then noted Justice Harlan's Walker Process 
concurrence seeking to distinguish patents obtained by deliberate 
fraud from patents "rendered invalid or unenforceable for other 
reasons...."18  He feared that permitting private antitrust challenges 
to 
 
 also reach monopolies practiced under patents that for one 
reason or another may turn out to be voidable under one or 
more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of 
a patent, might well chill the disclosure of inventions through 
the obtaining of a patent because of fear of the vexations or 
punitive consequences of treble-damage suits. 
 
The Federal Circuit then observed that:  
 
 Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Walker 
Process, as well as Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, we 
have distinguished "inequitable conduct" from Walker Process 
fraud, noting that inequitable conduct is a broader, more 
inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to 
support a Walker Process counterclaim.19 
 
Fraud was defined the in the common law sense as: 
 
 (1) a representation of a material fact, (2) the falsity of that 
representation, (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of 
mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be 
the equivalent of intent (scienter), (4) a justifiable reliance 
upon the misrepresentation by the party deceived which 
                                                 
     17Nobelpharma, id. at 1068, citing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961), and Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. 
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
     18Id. at 1069, quoting Walker Process, note 4, 382 U.S. at 179-80 (Harlan, 
J., concurring). 
     19Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069.  See also DDAVP Direct Purchaser 
Antitrust Litigation, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75726 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (mere 
inequitable conduct as opposed to fraud before PTO insufficient to create Walker 
Process claim on part of purchasers). 
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induces him to act thereon, and (5) injury to the party 
deceived as a result of his reliance on the 
misrepresentation.20 
 
 Clearly, a patent might be invalid or unenforceable for reasons 
falling short of fraud in this common law sense.  Further, an 
infringement action might be improper even though the patent is 
valid -- as, for example, when the patentee knows that the 
infringement defendant's technology does not infringe because none 
of the claims in the asserted patent cover it.21 
 
 The court then addressed an issue left undecided by the 
Supreme Court in its PRE decision22 -- namely, how "Noerr applies 
to the ex parte application process," and particularly, "how it applies 
to the Walker Process claim."23  The Federal Circuit itself had twice 
refused to resolve this issue.24  The court then concluded: 
 
 PRE and Walker Process provide alternative legal grounds on 
which a patentee may be stripped of its immunity from the 
antitrust laws; both legal theories may be applied to the same 
conduct.  Moreover, we need not find a way to merge these 
decisions.  Each provides its own basis for depriving a patent 
owner of immunity from the antitrust laws;  either or both may 
be applicable to a particular party's conduct in obtaining and 
                                                 
     20Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069-1070.  See also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. 
v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1358 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev'd on 
nonantitrust grds., 546 U.S. 394 (2006) (repeating these requirements; ultimately 
rejecting antitrust claim for failure to show relevant market; on intent, the court 
stated that "a state of mind so reckless as to the consequences that it is held to be 
the equivalent of intent" will suffice to show fraud). 
     21In the copyright context, see PRE, note 14, where the validity of the 
infringement plaintiff's copyright was not in dispute; rather, the antitrust 
counterclaim was based on the legal theory that the compensated playing of a 
videodisc in a hotel room was not an infringement of the copyright. 
     22See note 14. 
     23Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071, quoting district court opinion, 930 F.Supp. 
at 1253, which was in turn referring to PRE, note 14, 508 U.S. at 61 n. 6. 
     24Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071, citing FilmTec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 
F.3d 931, 939 n. 2 (Fed.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 814 (1996); Carroll 
Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1583 n. 10 (Fed.Cir.1993). 
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enforcing a patent.  The Supreme Court saw no need to 
merge these separate lines of cases and neither do we.25 
 
 First, the court held, if the fraud elements of the Walker 
Process claim could be made out, as well as the "other criteria" for 
antitrust liability,26 "such liability can be imposed without the 
additional sham inquiry required under PRE."27  That is, assuming 
the patent was procured by fraud and the other elements of an 
antitrust claim were met, an infringement suit based on that patent 
encountered automatic antitrust liability. 
 
 By contrast, 
 
 irrespective of the patent applicant's conduct before the PTO, 
an antitrust claim can also be based on a PRE allegation that 
a suit is baseless; in order to prove that a suit was within 
Noerr's "sham" exception to immunity, an antitrust plaintiff 
must prove that the suit was both objectively baseless and 
subjectively motivated by a desire to impose collateral, 
anti-competitive injury rather than to obtain a justifiable legal 
remedy.28 
 
As the court explained: 
 
  Thus, under PRE, a sham suit must be both 
subjectively brought in bad faith and based on a theory of 
either infringement or validity that is objectively baseless.  
Accordingly, if a suit is not objectively baseless, an antitrust 
defendant's subjective motivation is immaterial.  In contrast 
with a Walker Process claim, a patentee's activities in 
procuring the patent are not necessarily at issue.  It is the 
bringing of the lawsuit that is subjectively and objectively 
baseless that must be proved.29 
                                                 
     25Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. 
     26On these other requirements, see 1 Antitrust Law &208 ("sham" filings 
constitute only the conduct element of antitrust offense). 
     27Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1071. 
     28Nobelpharma, id. at 1071, citing PRE, 508 U.S. at 60-61. 
     29Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072. 
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In sum, in the Federal Circuit's conception the "bringing of the 
lawsuit" was the relevant antitrust act for a PRE style claim, while it 
was the patentee's actions in procuring its patent that were relevant 
to the Walker Process antitrust claim.  To us, the two actions do not 
differ all that much, and the "bringing of the lawsuit" or similar 
exclusionary activity is in fact the gravamen of both offenses. 
 
 In Nobelpharma the court found substantial evidence from 
which a jury could have reached factual conclusions that would "strip 
NP [the infringement plaintiff] of its immunity from antitrust liability."30  
This evidence indicated that the patentee had fraudulently failed to 
disclose information to the PTO that would have prevented the 
patent from being issued. Evidence in the record supported a finding 
of Walker Process fraud on all of the elements listed above.  Further, 
there was evidence that the defendant brought its infringement suit 
with knowledge that the patent application had been fraudulent.31 
 
 Nevertheless, the distinctions between Walker Process 
antitrust liability and liability for "sham" infringement litigation are 
somewhat elusive.  First, while Walker Process itself spoke as if 
"obtaining" a patent by fraud was the gravamen of the antitrust 
defense,32 the actual facts were that the patent holder was bringing 
an infringement action.  As noted previously, simply obtaining a 
patent fraudulently with no subsequent enforcement activity does not 
violate the Sherman Act, although it may violate the FTC Act.33  Of 
course, one might enforce a fraudulently obtained patent in other 
ways than by making or threatening infringement actions.  For 
example, one might simply assert the patent and warn a potential 
rival to stay out of the market the patent assertedly covers; or one 
might insist on collecting a royalty for technology allegedly covered 
by such a patent.  Clearly a patent obtained by fraud could be used 
                                                 
     30Nobelpharma, id. at 1073. 
     31Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1072. 
     32See Walker Process, note 4, 382 U.S. at 174, sustaining an amended 
counterclaim alleging that the antitrust defendant "illegally monopolized interstate 
and foreign commerce by fraudulently and in bad faith obtaining and maintaining ... 
its patent ... well knowing that it had no basis for ... a patent...." 
     33The Federal Circuit recognizes this proposition.  See, Cygnus case, note 
11. 
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in an anticompetitive way falling short of an infringement suit.  
Whether such practices are sufficiently exclusionary so as to violate 
the antitrust laws cannot be stated categorically. 
 
 Second, once an infringement action is brought or 
threatened34 then the "sham" issue is addressed first by considering 
whether the lawsuit is objectively baseless.35  A large number of 
defects could render a lawsuit objectively baseless, including but not 
limited to these:  (1) the patent may have been procured by fraud in 
the Walker Process sense, and thus be invalid and unenforceable;36  
(2) the patent may be rendered unenforceable by inequitable 
conduct before the PTO or by other knowledge or activities falling 
short of fraud; (3) The patent may have expired;37 (4) the patent may 
be valid and enforceable, but the infringement plaintiff may know or 
should have known that the infringement defendant's technology 
does not infringe the patent;38 (5) the infringement defendant's 
actions may be lawful as a result of a previously granted license;39 
                                                 
     34On Noerr protection for threatened litigation, provided it is not a "sham," 
see 1 Antitrust Law &205e.  See also Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 
84 IND. L.J. (2008) (advocating antitrust remedy). 
     35See 1 Antitrust Law &205b. 
     36Cf. Open LCR.Com, Inc. v. Rates Tech., Inc.., 112 F.Supp.2d 1223 
(D.Colo. 2000) (plaintiff's allegations that patentee failed to disclose prior art to 
PTO and then threatened and brought infringement claims without realistic 
expectation of success on merits, even after antitrust plaintiff documented the 
existence of the prior art, were sufficient to support antitrust action). 
     37See International Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. Pilkington PLC, 137 F.3d 1382 
(9th Cir. 1998) (infringement suit based on expired patents a possible antitrust 
violation). 
     38Cf. Besser case, note 8 (infringement plaintiff did not have good reason to 
believe that infringement defendant's technology infringed); Moore USA, Inc. v. 
Standard Register Co., 139 F.Supp. 2d 348 W.D.N.Y. 2001) (refusing to dismiss 
Sherman '2 counterclaim allegation that patentee filed infringement claim while 
knowing that counterclaimant's product did not infringe because it did not 
incorporate an essential ingredient); Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 95 F.Supp.2d 
1155 (D.Colo. 2000) (for purposes of filing antitrust claim, infringement defendant 
was entitled to discovery of factual basis for infringement plaintiff's allegations that 
former's technology infringed the latter's patent). 
     39Cf. Glass Equip. Dvlpmnt. v. Besten, 174 F.3d 1337 (Fed.Cir. 1999) 
(patentee sued for infringement; alleged infringer claimed it had an implied license 
to use the patented technology and filed antitrust counterclaim; court finds no 
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(6) there may be a legal or jurisdictional rule that makes the 
infringement suit improper as a matter of law.40 
 
 Third, the Nobelpharma decision concluded that if the 
infringement defendant (antitrust plaintiff) shows that a patent was 
obtained by fraud, then the unreasonableness of the infringement 
suit has automatically been established.  As a result no additional 
jury instructions under PRE or Noerr are required.41  The court did 
not indicate what these instructions would have been, but apparently 
they would have advised the jury that the right to bring an 
infringement suit is broad and cannot be limited except for a proven 
sham.  But in that case the difference between a Walker Process 
fraud case and a PRE-style infringement action is small, and 
revolves only around the necessity of bringing an additional jury 
instruction that, while unnecessary in the first, would have been 
advisable in any event, given that the jury might have failed to find 
fraud but might have found other conduct rendering the lawsuit a 
sham. 
 
 The Nobelpharma decision thus seems to exaggerate the 
                                                                                                                            
implied license, which entails that infringement claim was well founded; thus no 
antitrust violation). 
     40Cf. PRE, note 14 (copyright infringement action not improperly brought 
where circuits were divided on a dispositive question of law and one had sided with 
the infringement plaintiff's position); Mitek Surg. Prods., Inc. v. Arthrex, Inc., 230 
F.3d 1383, 2000 WL 217637, 2000-1 Trade Cas. &72803 (Fed. Cir. 2000, unpub.) 
(two different district courts had disagreed on claim construction of patent subject 
to infringement action; patentee entitled to bring infringement action relying on the 
favorable district court holding).  As a general matter, claim construction presents a 
question of law.  See also Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); 
IMS Tech., Inc. v. Hass Automation, Inc., 206 F.3d 1422, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 2000), 
cert. dismissed, 530 U.S. 1299 (2000); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 
F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  A lawsuit in one court based on a claim construction 
broader than that given in one or more other courts raises issues analogous to 
those in PRE.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law '2.2c (2001 & 2007 Supp.).  Cf. Goss Int'l 
Americas, Inc. v. MAN Roland, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75632 (D.N.H. Mar. 12, 
2007) (denying Walker Process claim based on alleged inequitable conduct in 
procurement of a different patent than the one being enforced when it could not be 
shown that inequitable conduct in procurement of one patent would have 
invalidated the second patent). 
     41See Nobelpharma, note 13, 141 F.3d at 1073. 
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difference between situations in which an infringement action is 
unwarranted because the patent was obtained by fraud, and those 
where the action is unwarranted as a result of other defects that the 
infringement plaintiff clearly knew or (measured objectively) should 
have known.  The all important question in both is whether a 
reasonable actor in the infringement plaintiff's position should have 
known at the time of the lawsuit that the infringement action or other 
exclusionary conduct was legally inappropriate under the 
circumstances.  Fraud in obtaining a patent is only one of many 
circumstances rendering the infringement action inappropriate.42 
 
 Further, while failing to require the Noerr/PRE instruction may 
have been harmless error in the case at hand, that would not always 
be so.  First, if the jury found no fraud but found other reasons why 
the suit should not have been brought, failure to give the instruction 
might require a new trial.  In such a case there must be a conclusion 
that the lawsuit was objectively baseless, and this question could be 
one of fact, depending on the circumstances.  Second, there may be 
situations in which even an infringement lawsuit based on a 
fraudulently procured patent could not be the basis of an antitrust 
counterclaim.  Consider, for example, the patentee who obtains its 
patent by fraud and then transfers it or gives an exclusive license to 
an innocent acquirer.  The acquirer, not knowing of the fraud, 
believes its enforcement right to be valid and brings an infringement 
suit.  In such a case it would be the infringement plaintiff's actual or 
objective knowledge at the time of the infringement suit that would 
establish its antitrust culpability. 
 
 Whatever the limits on unfounded suits generally, the 
monopolist burdening a rival with a bad faith suit clearly commits an 
exclusionary act.  At the same time, however, even the monopolist is 
                                                 
     42Consider the Supreme Court's decision in KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 
127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007), which changed the patentability standard of obviousness, 
holding that the Federal Circuit had not been sufficiently strict in cases where 
someone reasonably skilled in the art could have anticipated the patent claim, 
even in a different field.  At this writing it is too early to assess the impact of KSR 
on antitrust challenges to infringement actions.  Quite possibly, however, a certain 
class of patents previously thought valid will now be invalid under the KSR 
standard.  One who brought suit on such a patent knowing of the almost certain 
invalidity might reasonably be subjected to an antitrust counterclaim.  This would 
be an example of a change in a rule of law that subsequently rendered a certain 
class of patents invalid. 
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entitled to protect its property rights.  Too expansive a conception of 
baselessness could turn many infringement actions into antitrust 
claims against the infringement plaintiff, thus putting the patent 
owner at peril even in defending its own property rights.43 
 
 As noted before some cases do not involve a filed 
infringement action at all, but only a threat to sue or communications 
to customers.44  For example, consider the monopolist who -- 
knowing its patent to be invalid -- writes a letter to a rival's customers 
threatening infringement actions if they continue buying from the 
rival.45  The customers are very likely in an even poorer position than 
the rival to know about the patent's invalidity.  Further, the cost to a 
customer of switching its patronage may be far lower than the cost to 
the rival of defending any infringement action.  Indeed, acting under 
uncertainty the customers may switch rather than accept any 
apparent risk of litigating a costly infringement suit.46 
 
"Sham" infringement claim or enforcement action satisfies '2 
conduct requirement; tort law alternative   
 
 The improper patent infringement suit serves to establish the 
conduct element of a '2 claim.47  In addition the antitrust plaintiff 
                                                 
     43Antitrust's Noerr doctrine generally deals with these issues.  See Ch. 2A. 
     44See Va. Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 1997), 
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 815 (1998) ("The antitrust laws do not preclude patentees 
from putting suspected infringers on notice of suspected infringement). 
     45See, e.g., Johnson v. Con-Vey/Keystone, Inc., 856 F.Supp. 1443 (D.Or. 
1994) (notifying rivals' customers concerning patent infringement suit not protected 
by Noerr).  Compare Oetiker v. Jurid Werke GmbH, 671 F.2d 596, 601 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (letter, ignored by plaintiff's suppliers, stating without bad faith that patent 
holder "would be forced to vindicate its patent right if no settlement proposal were 
received" constituted "neither a threat nor an enforcement sufficient to trigger the 
antitrust laws"). 
     46See Goss Int'l Americas, Inc. v. MAN Roland, Inc., 2006 WL 1575287, 
2006-2 Trade Cas. &75392 (D.N.H. June 2, 2006) (Walker Process claim did not 
require that owner of fraudulently obtained patent actually file patent infringement 
suit; warning letters or other threats based on such a patent could suffice; relying 
on Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1344-45, 1357-
58 (Fed. Cir. 2004), rev'd in part on other grds., 126 S.Ct. 980 (2006). 
     47See 1 Antitrust Law &208 (3d ed. 2006). 
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must show the relevant market power requirement, which can be in 
the implicated patent itself, or in the patentee's underlying market 
share in a monopoly maintenance case. 
 
 If the infringement plaintiff lacks substantial power in a 
relevant market but for the patent, then the antitrust plaintiff must 
show that the patent itself is sufficient to confer this power or 
dangerously threaten to do so, thus making the improper suit an 
exclusionary practice in the '2 sense.  However, if the infringement 
plaintiff already has substantial power in the relevant market, then an 
improper infringement action on any patent tending to exclude rivals 
could be unlawfully exclusionary, even if that patent itself did not 
dominate a market.48  Finally, the evidence as a whole must be 
sufficient to give rise to an inference of harm to competition. 
 
 When these structural preconditions for an antitrust violation 
are lacking, the infringement defendant might nevertheless be able 
to pursue a state tort claim for common law fraud, malicious 
prosecution, or a related offense.49  The important difference 
                                                 
     48See Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2006 WL 2458717 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 22, 
2006) (antitrust claimant sufficiently alleged power with claim that infringement 
plaintiff possessed 65 percent of market for internet DVD movie rentals). 
 
 See also Golan v. Pingel Enterp., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(even if assertions of patent were improper, there was no antitrust violation 
because patentee was not shown to have market power in its patented product); 
William Wrigley, Jr., Co. v. Cadbury Adams USA, LLC, 2005 WL 936928, 2005-1 
Trade Cas. &74,780 (N.D. 111. Apr. 22, 2005) (refusing to dismiss Walker Process 
counterclaim that patent infringement action violated '2; rejecting antitrust 
defendant's argument that because basis of claim was that patent was invalid, 
antitrust plaintiff could not show dangerous probability of success in creating a 
monopoly-note that even if patent is significant contributor to market power, basis 
of claim is that antitrust defendant was misusing infringement action so as to give 
recognition to the patent); Medtronic AVE, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2001 WL 
652016, 2001-2 Trade Cas. &73,388 (D. Del. March 30, 2001) (patentee could 
have violated '2 by bringing infringement action on patent procured by fraud; while 
counterclaim did not allege patentee's market share, there were other ways of 
measuring market power); E-Z Bozuz, L.L.C. v. Prof'l Product Research Co., Inc., 
2003 WL 22068573 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2003) (rejecting antitrust counterclaim to 
patent infringement suit where infringement defendant did not claim that patentee 
had market power in its patented hand-tied bow maker). 
     49On the relationship between baseless suits and state law malicious 
prosecution claims, see Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 204 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir. 
2000) (Federal Circuit's determination that patent infringement suit was not 
objectively basis because genuine factual issues existed about validity of patent, 
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between such common law claims and the antitrust claim is that the 
former equate the wrong with the conduct itself rather than with the 
threat of monopoly.  Of course, treble damages and attorneys fees 




 Infringement claims can range from a bad faith suit actually 
known by its plaintiff to be groundless, to a "carelessly" brought 
action, to a reasonable but uncertain suit, and to one that is both 
sure and actually successful.  Often reliable evidence about the 
infringement plaintiff's subjective mental state will be unavailable.  In 
any event, in the case of valid claims mental state is irrelevant, for 
the patentee just as any property owner can enforce its rights no 
matter what its intent.50 
 
 In any event, objective evidence about what is reasonable 
under the circumstance often provides a basis for determining the 
reasonableness of the infringement claim.  Requiring objective 
baselessness also encourages reasonable care in subjecting rivals 
to the burdens of an infringement action. Accordingly, a monopolist's 
careless challenges made without adequate inquiry into underlying 
                                                                                                                            
did not collaterally estop subsequent Ninth Circuit malicious prosecution action 
challenging same infringement suit; while "objectively baseless" standard 
governed both claims, in the malicious prosecution claim the infringement 
defendant also raised issues of fraud on the patent office and perjury during 
course of infringement trial).  Cf. Conroy v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, Inc., 325 F. 
Supp. 2d 1049,1056 (N.D. Cal. 2004). When Del Monte threatened to enforce 
patents on its hybrid pineapples the plaintiff filed a state law antitrust and unfair 
competition claim, which Del Monte then removed to federal court. The latter court 
then granted the plaintiff's motion to remand to state court, holding that the federal 
court lacked jurisdiction because no patent issues were raised because no 
infringement suit had been filed and the threats had been made with respect to 
non-infringing pineapples; as a result the patent laws were not implicated. 
 
 Cf. Assessment Technologies v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 
2003); 361 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2004) (improper copyright infringement lawsuit 
designed to exclude others from uncopyrightable data could be copyright misuse; 
conduct alleged as tortious malicious prosecution). 
     50See, e.g., Independent Service Org. (ISO) Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 
(Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143 (2001) (since validity of Xerox's 
patent had not been disputed, the attempt to enforce them via an infringement 
counterclaim could not be baseless). 
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facts or law should also be regarded as improper. 
 
 In Professional Real Estate (PRE) the Supreme Court held 
that a copyright (not patent) infringement suit is immune from 
antitrust challenge unless it is baseless, with baselessness 
measured by an objective standard.51  Importantly, the 
"baselessness" question in PRE referred entirely to the 
reasonableness of the infringement plaintiff's interpretation of the 
federal copyright statute as a matter of law.  The decision expressly 
deferred the question of antitrust immunity if the infringement plaintiff 
engaged in "fraud or other misrepresentations" of fact.52 
 
 The relevant points respecting PRE are these: 
 
 (1)  If the disputed question in the patent infringement suit is 
entirely a question of law -- as, for example, whether the 
infringement plaintiff's interpretation of a particular patent doctrine is 
objectively reasonable53 -- then PRE immunizes any antitrust 
challenge to the infringement action when the infringement suit itself 
is objectively well founded.  These are essentially the facts of the 
PRE case itself, except that it involved copyright rather than patent 
law. 
 
 (2)  PRE does not explicitly apply to the more usual case 
where the question in the patent infringement suit involves a 
disputed matter of fact or complex mixed questions of law and fact.54  
This could include such issues as whether the infringement 
                                                 
     51See note 14, 508 U.S. 49.  Cf. B.V. Optische Industrie de Oude Delft v. 
Hologic, Inc., 909 F.Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (fact that patent infringement suit 
was settled does not establish conclusively that it could not be an antitrust 
violation; to be sure, the cost of settling might be less than the cost of litigating, but 
one must query whether the infringement defendant's willingness to settle indicates 
that the suit must not have been objectively baseless). 
     52Id. at 1929 n.6.  The Court cited the majority's and Justice Harlan's 
concurring opinion in Walker Process, note 4, 382 U.S. at 176-177, 179-180, both 
of which noted that unjustified claims made in patent infringement suits typically 
involve false allegations of fact rather than irrational theories of law. 
     53E.g., Mitek Surgical, note 40, where the infringement claim depended on 
the claim construction given to the patent, which is a question of law. 
     54E.g., Carroll Touch, note 24. 
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defendant's conduct actually constitutes infringement, or whether 
information in the infringement plaintiff's possession or infirmities in 
the patent application process renders the patent invalid or 
unenforceable -- for example, where the patentee lied about 
disqualifying prior sales.55  But if the infringement plaintiff has made 
an objectively reasonable investigation and has an objectively 
reasonable basis for believing that its patent is valid, enforceable, 
and infringed under the circumstances, then its infringement suit 
enjoys antitrust immunity even if the court should subsequently 
disagree and find the patent invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed.56 
 
 (3)  If the patent infringement claim succeeds antitrust 
immunity is automatic,57 subject to one important exception: if it 
should subsequently be determined that the claim's success 
depended on information which the patentee know or should have 
known at the time of presenting it to be false, then the suit could still 
be a "sham" and thus satisfy the conduct requirement for a '2 claim.  
Although some dicta in the PRE decision might be read to immunize 
any successful suit, the facts of that case involved only a disputed 
question of law and the decision cannot be read to immunize a 
lawsuit that was successful only because of fraudulently made 
factual misrepresentations in the course of litigation.58 
                                                 
     55E.g., Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 128 S.Ct. 375 (2007) (applicant lied in application about disqualifying sales 
made more than one year prior to application). 
     56Note that as many as half of patents, once committed to litigation, are 
found to be invalid.  See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on 
the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding about 46% 
of litigated patents to be invalid). 
     57See Filmtec, note 24, 67 F.3d at 936.  And see Contour Chair Lounge Co. 
v. True-Fit Chair, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (antitrust liability for 
baseless infringement suit cannot obtain when the patent was found to be valid). 
     58To illustrate, the patentee whose patent was unenforceable because it 
swore to the PTO that there were no disqualifying prior sales, when such sales had 
actually occurred, might succeed in a subsequent infringement suit if evidence of 
the prior sales was not exposed.  But if exposed later, such evidence might serve 
both to invalidate the patent and support the antitrust claim.  See the discussion 
infra of Dippin' Dots, note 55.  
 
 See Hydranautics v. Filmtec Corp., 224 Fed.Appx. 675, 2007-1 Trade Cas. 
&75646 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2007, unpublished) (success in the underlying patent 
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 (4)  In PRE the Supreme Court also said this in dicta: 
 
 Only if challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a 
court examine the litigant's subjective motivation.  Under this 
second part of our definition of sham, the court should focus 
on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals "an attempt to 
interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor ... through the "use [of] the governmental 
process--as opposed to the outcome of that process--as an 
anticompetitive weapon."  This two-tiered process requires the 
plaintiff to disprove the challenged lawsuit's legal viability 
before the court will entertain evidence of the suit's economic 
viability.  Of course, even a plaintiff who defeats the 
defendant's claim to Noerr immunity by demonstrating both 
the objective and the subjective components of a sham must 
still prove a substantive antitrust violation.  Proof of a sham 
merely deprives the defendant of immunity;  it does not relieve 
the plaintiff of the obligation to establish all other elements of 
his claim.59 
 
 This language suggests that the '2 claim includes a 
"subjective" as well as an "objective" element.  These dicta should 
not be read to require inquiry into the infringement plaintiff's actual 
state of mind.  Here, as anywhere else, intent can be inferred from 
sufficiently unambiguous conduct.  Consider the patentee who 
himself made sales prior to the patent application that would have 
barred patentability of disclosed.   The Patent Act's on sale bar 
prevents patenting of a product that was sold more than a year prior 
to the filing of the initial patent application.60   The applicant signed a 
                                                                                                                            
infringement suit created a presumption that the suit was properly brought which 
could be rebutted only by a showing of fraud or perjury).  See also Hydranautics, 
note 49, 204 F.3d at 887: 
 
 [T]he existence of probable cause to institute legal proceedings precludes 
a finding that an antitrust defendant has engaged in sham litigation.... 
Under our decision today, therefore, a proper probable cause 
determination irrefutably demonstrates that an antitrust plaintiff has not 
proved the objective prong of the sham exception and that the defendant 
is accordingly entitled to... immunity. 
     59PRE, note 14, 508 U.S. at 60 (citations omitted). 
     6035 U.S.C. ' 102(b). 
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sworn statement to the PTO that no such sales had occurred and 
years later brings an infringement action on this patent.  Such a 
case, if the facts are sufficiently unambiguous, would serve to 
establish both the objective and the "subjective" motivation 
necessary, even though there is not additional evidence of subjective 
intent such as a memorandum between company officials stating "we 
are bringing this lawsuit even though we know that the on sale bar 
renders this patent unenforceable." 
 
 In Dippin' Dots the Federal Circuit appeared to read the PRE 
language much more literally.  The infringement plaintiff's patent was 
rendered unenforceable by some 800 retail sales that occurred more 
than a year before the initial patent application was filed.61  The 
patentee neglected to disclose this information in its application, and 
the patentee's declaration contained a sworn statement that no such 
sales had occurred.  Public sales made more than one year prior to 
filing bar patentability under '102(b) of the Patent Act, and also 
serve to make the patent "obvious" under '103.62  The court found 
that the information, if disclosed, would almost certainly have barred 
patentability and held the patent invalid.63 
 
 The court nevertheless held that the degree of inequitable 
conduct necessary to invalidate the patent was not as great as the 
degree needed to support an antitrust claim.  In this case the only 
evidence of the patentee's anticompetitive intent was the fact that it 
had made the 800 sales over a one week period and then later 
swore to the PTO that the sales had not occurred.  It subsequently 
also filed a patent infringement suit against those offending one or 
more of the claims made in the patent.  The Federal Circuit held that 
                                                 
     61Dippin' Dots, note 55. 
     62See 35 U.S.C. ''102(b), 103. 
     63See 476 F.3d at 1346: 
 
 Absent explanation, the evidence of a knowing failure to disclose sales 
that bear all the earmarks of commercialization reasonably supports an 
inference that the inventor's attorney intended to mislead the PTO. The 
concealment of sales information can be particularly egregious because, 
unlike the applicant's failure to disclose, for example, a material patent 
reference, the examiner has no way of securing the information on his 
own. 
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while this omission clearly qualified as inequitable conduct, it fell 
short of fraud in the Walker Process sense, which requires a 
stronger showing of both intent and materiality.64  In order to support 
a Walker Process antitrust case "there must be evidence of intent 
separable from the simple fact of the omission."65  The court 
observed: 
 
 It might be argued that because the omitted reference was so 
important to patentability, DDI [the patentee] must have 
known of its importance and must have made a conscious 
decision not to disclose it. That argument has some force, but 
to take it too far would be to allow the high materiality of the 
omission to be balanced against a lesser showing of 
deceptive intent by the patentee. Weighing intent and 
materiality together is appropriate when assessing whether 
the patentee's prosecution conduct was inequitable. However, 
when Walker Process claimants wield that conduct as a 
"sword" to obtain antitrust damages rather than as a mere 
"shield" against enforcement of the patent, they must prove 
deceptive intent independently.66 
 
 This approach re-creates some of the same difficulties of pre-
Matsushita antitrust litigation under standards reluctant to grant 
                                                 
     64Relying on Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 
1068-1069 (Fed.Cir.1998). 
     65476 F.3d at 1347 ("The difference in breadth between inequitable conduct 
and Walker Process fraud admits the possibility of a close case whose facts reach 
the level of inequitable conduct, but not of fraud before the PTO. This is such a 
case."). 
     66476 F.3d at 1348 (internal citations omitted).  The court added: 
 
  While Walker Process intent may be inferred from the facts and 
circumstances of a case, "[a] mere failure to cite a reference to the PTO 
will not suffice."  This is not to say that an omission always reduces to 
"mere failure to cite." We acknowledged in Nobelpharma "that omissions, 
as well as misrepresentations, may in limited circumstances support a 
finding of Walker Process fraud ... because a fraudulent omission can be 
just as reprehensible as a fraudulent misrepresentation." We believe, 
though, that to find a prosecution omission fraudulent there must be 
evidence of intent separable from the simple fact of the omission. 
 
(citing and quoting Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1070-1071). 
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summary judgment,67 except in reverse.  It requires extensive 
discovery through the patentee's documents for evidence of 
anticompetitive "intent" other than that manifested in the patent 
application itself.  Further, it makes the infringement defendant's 
antitrust counterclaim dependent on the vagaries of the patentee's 
document retention policy or other efforts to suppress incriminating 
information, often attending pre-application activities that occurred 
many years prior to the litigation.  For example, in Dippin Dots the 
sales found to invalidate the patent occurred in 1987.  The 
subsequent patent infringement suit was filed in April of 2000, some 
thirteen years later.68  By that time the evidence of disqualifying 
sales could very well have been suppressed unless available from 
sources other than the patentee. 
                                                
 
 Further, the improper conduct was not limited to the 
misrepresentation to the PTO about prior sales; it also consisted in 
the subsequent filing of a patent infringement lawsuit, presumably 
designed to exclude the infringement defendant in the hopes that the 
disqualifying sales would not be discovered.  Certainly one who files 
a patent infringement suit with present knowledge that the patent is 
unenforceable has met '2's conduct requirement. 
 
Objectively Unreasonable Patent Litigation 
 
Patents of questionable validity or enforceability 
 
 As noted above, PRE does not fully resolve the question of 
how to determine when a patent infringement suit is a "sham" which 
itself violates '2 of the Sherman Act.  Patent infringement suits 
typically concern disputed issues of fact, most often going to patent 
validity, for which the "sham" analysis is different than it is for 
questions of law.  Significantly, a complaint raising nothing more than 
a disputed question of law can frequently be disposed of without any 
discovery or trial.  Disputes raising significant disputed fact issues 
often cannot be.69 
 
     67See 2 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &308 (3d ed. 
2007). 
     68See In re Dippin' Dots Patent Litigation, 249 F.Supp.2d 1346 
(N.D.Ga.,2003) (docket entry). 
     69See Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetales del Centro S.A. de C.E.V., 
464 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (rejecting antitrust counterclaim to patent 
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 The lower courts have wrestled with this problem for some 
time, and have developed strict requirements for any infringement 
defendant claiming that the infringement action violated the antitrust 
laws.70  In Handgards the Ninth Circuit observed that an undue 
                                                                                                                            
infringement action based on claim that patentee falsely stated that certain of its 
products were covered by a particular patent claim when patentee had consistently 
maintained that they were covered and no court had adjudicated to the contrary; 
further, its legal position seemed plausible; also, antitrust counterclaimant alleged 
that patentee continued to warn former's customers of infringement even after 
counterclaimant notified patentee that it had changed its process so as to no 
longer infringe; patentee was entitled not to accept this notification at face value 
without proof); Netflix, Inc. v. Blockbuster, Inc., 2006-2 Trade Cas. &75484 
(N.D.Cal. Aug. 22, 2006) (Blockbuster adequately alleged Walker Process violation 
in claim that Netflix committed fraud on PTO in acquiring business method patents 
and then filed bad faith infringement suit against rival; in particular Neflix failed to 
reference pre-existing patents held by a third party; that Netflix knew of these 
patents at the time it filed its own patent application; and that communication of the 
existence of these patents to examiner would have resulted in non-issuance of 
Netflix patents; court also concludes that Blockbuster adequately pled sham 
litigation as an "independent" basis for its antitrust lawsuit); Synopsys, Inc. v. 
Magma Design Automation, 2006 WL 1452803, 2006-1 Trade Cas. &75320 
(D.Del. May 25, 2006) (plaintiff adequately pled that defendant used fraudulently 
obtained patents and public accusations of infringement and other disparagement 
to drive plaintiff out of business; rejecting defendant's claim that antitrust injury was 
not adequately pled). 
 
 Cf. Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 437 F.Supp.2d 79 
(D.D.C. 2006) (defendant pioneer drug manufacturer could have violated antitrust 
laws by listing patent in orange book and announcing its own plans to make a 
generic version of its drug, thus ousting the plaintiff, a generic competitor, but then 
refusing to go ahead with the generic; however, ultimately concluding that statute 
of limitations barred the claim); General Physiotherapy, Inc., v. Sybaritic, Inc., 2006 
WL 269991, 2006-1 Trade Cas. &75121 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 1, 2006) (defendants 
multiplication of trademarks and possible fraud in obtaining some of them could 
have violated '2; denying summary judgment); Gardner v. Clark, 101 F.Supp.2d 
468 (N.D.Mis. 2000) (trademark infringement claim not objectively baseless). 
     70See, e.g., Dippin' Dots, note 55;  Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. Universal 
Avionics Systems Corp., 488 F.3d 982 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (dismissing antitrust 
counterclaim where patent infringement action not shown to be objectively 
baseless); Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(antitrust defendant's patent infringement suit was not objectively baseless even 
though infringement claim failed; defendant's interpretation of the patent claim in 
question was a reasonable one, and defendant was not required to give weight to 
letters from accused infringers asserting the patent's invalidity); BioTechnology 
General Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (underlying 
patent infringement suit found not to be baseless; as a result, antitrust 
counterclaim dismissed); Proportion-Air, Inc. v. Buzmatics, Inc., 57 F.3d 1085, 
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1995-2 Trade Cas. &71144 (Fed. Cir. unpub.) (same); Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. 
Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 141 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998, unpublished), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 930 (1998) (antitrust complaint dismissed where infringement suit 
found not to be objectively baseless); Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931 
(Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 814 (1999) (even though patentee lost 
infringement suit, its claim was not objectively baseless); Carroll Touch, note 24, 
15 F.3d at 1582-1583 (same). 
 
 See also Abbott Laboratories v. TEVA Pharmaceutical, Inc., 432 
F.Supp.2d 408 (D.Del. 2006) (rejecting motion to dismiss; pioneer's patent 
litigation against generics could have been a sham); Wellbutrin SR Antitrust 
Litigation, 2006 WL 616292, 2006-1 Trade Cas. &75158 (E.D.Pa. March 14, 2006) 
(under facts as alleged in complaint pioneer's patent infringement lawsuits against 
generic producer based on doctrine of equivalence would have been known to be 
frivolous; thus Walker Process claim survived motion to dismiss); Morton Grove 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Par Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2006 WL 850873, 2006-1 
Trade Cas. &75179 (N.D.Ill. March 28, 2006) (plaintiff adequately pled Walker 
Process claim based on knowing and wilful failures to disclose prior art at time of 
antitrust defendant's patent application, including an allegation that but for the 
failures to disclose the patent would not have issued; also approving "sham" 
litigation claim); Albert Hazelquist v. Guchi Moochie Tackle Co., Inc., 2004 WL 
1599378, 2004-2 Trade Cas. 174,498 (W.D. Wash., May 12, 2004) (trade dress; 
patentee originally represented to patent office that fishing tackle device was 
purely ornamental when in fact it had a function; this was not fraud sufficient to 
make its subsequent infringement claim a Walker Process violation); Honeywell 
Intl., Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 343 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D. Del. 2004) 
(rejecting antitrust counterclaim where underlying patent infringement suit was not 
objectively baseless); Applera Corp. v. MI Research, Inc., 303 F.Supp. 2d 130 (D. 
Conn. 2004) (evidence that patent owner had threatened infringement suits 
against other firms in order to obtain licenses and that its motives may have been 
anticompetitive was irrelevant if its current infringement action was not objectively 
baseless); Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (S.D. 
Fla. 2004) (brand-name manufacturer's attempts to enforce its pharmaceutical 
patents were not objectively baseless); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue 
Labs., 90 F.Supp.2d 540 (D.N.J. 2000) (finding fact issue whether infringement 
plaintiff had obtained patent by fraud; denying summary judgment on antitrust 
counterclaim); Ecrix case, note 38 (requiring discovery on issue whether 
infringement plaintiff had reasonable basis for concluding that infringement 
defendant's technology actually infringed); Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Genpharm, 
Inc., 50 F.Supp.2d 367 (D.N.J. 1999) (question whether patents allegedly infringed 
by defendant's suit were unenforceable and suit brought only to obtain 
infringement defendant's trade secrets could not be resolved on motion to 
dismiss); Baxa Corp. v. McGaw, Inc., 996 F.Supp. 1044 (D.Co. 1998), aff'd 185 
F.3d 883 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (no antitrust violation where patent was not shown to be 
procured by either fraud or inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark 
Office); Independent Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 964 F.Supp. 1479 (D.Kan. 1997) 
(filing of patent infringement counterclaims not an antitrust violation where the 
counterclaims could not be characterized as objectively baseless). 
 
 Related decisions include Marketing Displays, Inc. v. Traffix Devices, Inc., 
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readiness to hold an infringement suit improper would diminish the 
protection afforded by patent grants, contrary to their purpose.71  To 
avoid that danger, the court presumed that patent infringement 
actions are reasonably brought and the antitrust plaintiff can defeat 
this presumption only by clear and convincing evidence.72  Similarly, 
                                                                                                                            
200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd on nonantitrust issue, 532 U.S. 23 (2001) 
(because trade dress rights can last beyond the expiration of patent rights, bringing 
of a trade dress infringement suit after patent had expired was not a "sham").  Cf. 
Undersea Breathing Sys., Inc. v. Nitrox Tech., Inc., 985 F.Supp. 752 (N.D.Ill. 
1997), app. dism'd, 155 F.3d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (infringement defendant could 
not show that infringement action constituted patent misuse or antitrust violation 
where there was only weak evidence suggesting that patentee had failed to 
disclose all prior art at time of application; court ultimately found insufficient 
evidence that patent was invalid, but also no infringement); Publications Intl. Ltd. v. 
W. Publishing Co., 1994 WL 23008, 1994-1 Trade Cas. &70,540 (N.D. Ill. 1994) 
(monopolization possible if market-dominating patent obtained by fraud for 
nonpatentable invention but appearing to have sufficient "colorable validity" to 
intimidate actual or potential rivals; refusal to dismiss complaint even though 
plaintiff alleged relevant market of "electronic storybooks," within which market 
there were apparently numerous non-infringing products); see also Agere Sys. 
Guardian Corp. v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F.Supp. 2d 726 (D. Del. Mar. 6, 2002) 
(antitrust counterclaimant sufficiently pled that infringement plaintiff was attempting 
to enforce patent obtained by fraud). 
 
 And see Andrx Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Elan Corp., PLC, 421 F.3d 1227 
(11th Cir. 2005) (rejecting antitrust claim that patent infringement suit was 
fraudulent because patent was not enforceable due to on-sale bar, where two 
other courts had already concluded that the on-sale bar did not apply so as to 
defeat the patent); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(Noerr and PRE protected filing of trademark and trade dress infringement 
counterclaims when these were found not to be objectively baseless); Novo 
Nordisk of N. America v. Genentech, Inc., 885 F.Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(patentee's infringement claim before international agency not objectively baseless 
simply because the claim was ultimately dismissed for discovery-related 
misconduct; magistrate had found some evidence of infringement). 
     71Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc. (Handgards I), 601 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). 
     72The antitrust plaintiff later succeeded in doing so.  Handgards, Inc. v. 
Ethicon, Inc. (Handgards II), 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1190 (1985). Because proving the patentee's bad faith for this purpose necessarily 
proved a "sham" exception to Noerr's privilege to sue, the court also held that 
requiring a jury instruction on the Noerr issue would be duplicative. Id. at 1295. 
 
 The Federal Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit in Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal 
Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also FMC Corp. v. The Manitowoc Co., 
654 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (requiring clear 
and convincing evidence); Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman, 651 F. Supp. 945 
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the Federal Circuit emphasized that every patent enjoys a strong 
presumption of validity,73 and the one seeking to show invalidity has 
the burden of proof.74  The court further declared that one 
challenging an infringement action on an invalid patent as an 
antitrust violation must show specific intent, not merely negligence or 
even recklessness with respect to the invalidity of the patent.75  That 
requirement seems consistent with the PRE requirement, discussed 
above, that the inquiry into "sham" consist of two parts.  First, one 
must determine on the basis of objective information whether the 
infringement suit was unreasonable under the circumstances.  
Second, and "[o]nly if challenged litigation is objectively meritless 
may a court examine the litigant's subjective motivation."76 
 
 The infringement plaintiff's subjective knowledge that a patent 
is invalid or unenforceable would make an enforcement suit 
exclusionary, as would its knowledge that the patent is otherwise 
unenforceable because of the patentee's misuse or some other 
equitable factor. However, the difficulty of knowing when a court will 
deem a valid patent unenforceable means that we can seldom find 
the infringement suit improper merely because a court refuses to 
enforce a valid patent. Thus the Eighth Circuit found no antitrust 
                                                                                                                            
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (same). 
     73As provided by 35 U.S.C. '282 (providing that both patent as a whole and 
each individual claim made in a patent enjoys presumption of validity, even if 
another claim has proved to be invalid; burden of proof on person alleging 
invalidity). 
     74American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). See also Technicon Instruments Corp. v. 
Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (mere bringing of a single 
infringement action on patent subsequently found invalid does not establish 
antitrust violation); Carlisle Corp. v. Hayes, 635 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Cal. 1986). 
     75725 F.2d at 1368. 
     76PRE, note 14 at 1928.  See Scientific Drilling Intl v. Gyrodata Corp., 215 
F.3d 1351, 1999 WL 674511 (Fed.Cir. 1999, unpublished) (since it had not yet 
been determined whether infringement plaintiff's suit was objectively baseless, it 
was premature to dismiss antitrust counterclaim); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. 
Comfortex Corp., 44 F.Supp.2d 145 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (on pretrial motion, 
separating patent infringement trial from antitrust counterclaim trial, because 
patentee's success on the first would make the second unnecessary).  Accord 
Ecrix Corp. v. Exabyte Corp., 191 F.R.D.611 (D.Colo. 2000). 
August, 2008 Hovenkamp, Walker Process 27 
violation when a firm sued to enforce a patent that was valid but 
determined to be unenforceable because of the patentee's "unfair" 
conduct.77  Similarly, the antitrust defendant in Argus had engaged in 
inequitable conduct before the patent office by failing to disclose 
sales of the patented product that had been made more than one 
year before the application was filed.78  The court declined to find an 
antitrust violation without proof of "knowing and willful patent fraud" 
that is "based on the use of an invalid patent to monopolize. ..."79  
And the FMC court held that "inequitable conduct" before the patent 
office is not enough, for negligent or even grossly negligent failure to 
disclose a material fact that might have led to nonissuance of a 
patent showed no more than "inequitable conduct."80  Fraud requires 
knowledge and specific intent to obtain an undeserved patent. 
 
 Clearly, however, if the antitrust defendant knew it was not 
entitled to relief because its patent was not enforceable, then its 
conduct could be both exclusionary and unprotected by either 
Noerr81 or PRE.  In sum, obtaining a patent by inequitable conduct 
falling short of fraud is not an antitrust violation; but bringing an 
infringement action with the subjective or readily discoverable 
knowledge that the patent is unenforceable may constitute a 
violation. 
                                                 
     77du Pont v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1273-1275 (8th Cir. 1980). 
     78Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
1987); accord Dippin' Dots, note 55. 
     79Id. at 1385, quoting SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 
1096, 1103-1104 (9th Cir. 1979). 
     80FMC, note 72, 835 F.2d at 1415 & n.9.  See also Korody-Colyer Corp. v. 
General Motors Corp., 828 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. 
Research Medical, 691 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Utah 1988) (antitrust plaintiff must show 
"intentional fraud in the common law sense": misrepresentation of a material fact 
going to the validity of the patent with knowledge of its falsity and reliance by the 
Patent Office on this misrepresentation in issuing the patent).  Cf. Glaverbel 
Society Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(defendant did not procure patent fraudulently or even engage in inequitable 
conduct when its initial patent application failed to refer to two similar patents, but 
the initial application was not required to do so; and where the company 
subsequently narrowed the scope of its patent upon patent office's re-examination; 
none of this came close to proving intent to deceive by clear and convincing 
evidence). 
     81See 1 Antitrust Law &203 (3d ed. 2006). 
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 Finally, the antitrust defendant is entitled to summary 
judgment unless the evidence shows that the facts necessary to 
support the antitrust plaintiff's claim are more likely than not to be 
true.82  This means not merely that the evidence must be consistent 
with the defendant's possession of the requisite knowledge or intent, 
but also that the evidence justifies the conclusion that such 
possession was more probable than not. Nonetheless, some courts 
continue to be quite reluctant to grant summary judgment.83 
 
Patent valid but not infringed 
 
 The same considerations discussed previously generally 
apply when the patent in question is of undisputed validity, but the 
infringement plaintiff took insufficient steps to ensure that the 
infringement defendant was actually an infringer.84  Of course, the 
patentee may have been careless.  But the monopolist might pursue 
a policy of protecting its market by launching a lawsuit against every 
rival product appearing on the scene, without regard to actual 
infringement, and simply to deter small rivals from entering. 
 
                                                 
     82See 2 Antitrust Law &308. 
     83E.g., Carlisle, note 74 at 965-967 (refusing summary judgment even 
though there was no evidence offered of fraud on the patent office by the antitrust 
defendant, but merely of some controversy as to the state of the prior art).  See 
also ID Security Systems Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Systems, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 
2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2003), amended by 268 F.Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
(troublesome dicta that evidence of patentee's previous patent infringement 
actions were admissible on question of anticompetitive intent, even though there 
was no evidence that the infringement actions were improper; relying on Kobe, Inc. 
v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 425 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 
837 (1953); ultimately dismissing claim on market power grounds); Applera Corp. 
v. MJ Research, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D. Conn. 2004) (evidence that patent 
owner priced licenses for its two patents in a way that forced licensees to take both 
even if they only wanted one was admissible relevant to antitrust counterclaim to 
infringement action, as well as patent misuse defense). 
     84The question of claim construction is closely related.  In general, the scope 
of the "claim" made in the patent application presents a question of law.  See 
Markman and other decisions cited in note 40.  In such cases the infringement 
defendant may not dispute the validity of the patent but alleges that it is not an 
infringer because the claim is to be construed more narrowly than the infringement 
plaintiff alleges. 
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 The PRE objective standard asks mainly whether the 
patentee exercised reasonable care in determining the fact of 
infringement.  Although we cannot discuss the many possibilities, a 
few illustrations and principles may be stated. 
 
 When the monopolist is vindicating a product patent, we can 
at least insist that it inspect the allegedly infringing article and draw a 
reasonable conclusion of infringement before filing its infringement 
suit or taking other actions, such as writing letters to customers, that 
might injure the alleged infringer's market position.85  This restriction 
applies regardless of any sincere belief the monopolist might have 
about the impossibility of a non-infringing product in its field.86 
 
 The product itself may not reveal the presence or absence of 
an infringed process patent.  In that case, the monopolist should be 
compelled to request a reasonable opportunity to inspect the 
allegedly infringing process before attacking. Once these 
preliminaries have occurred, we hesitate to appraise too precisely 
the monopolist-patentee's judgment about infringement -- especially 
in an infringement suit where the infringement defendant might want 
to divert the suit from the question of infringement to the plaintiff's 
reasonableness in suing. The patentee should not be forced to sue 
at its peril. Yet, neither should its discretion be completely immune 
from review. Accordingly, we conclude that a monopolist-patentee's 
judgment in attacking an infringer may be tested for reasonableness 
in any appropriate suit, but the alleged infringer must overcome a 
presumption of reasonableness in favor of a patentee whose 
behavior appears reasonable on its face.  We emphasize that issues 
concerning the legal question of infringement and the facts that 
constitute it are to be addressed directly under the patent laws. 
                                                 
     85The court did so insist in Kobe v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).  See also Ecrix, note 38, 95 
F.Supp.2d 1155 (permitting antitrust plaintiff discovery into factual basis for 
infringement plaintiff's allegation that former's technology infringed the latter's 
patent). 
     86Such a rule might be thought futile because antitrust law is not likely to 
interfere very effectively with a patentee's propensity to sue once it goes through 
the motions of inspecting the allegedly infringing article. But even if some 
patentees sue with undetected bad faith, encouraging proper forms of conduct can 
beneficially influence the substance of behavior. This limited intervention, 
moreover, may threaten an appraisal of the patentee's judgment in suing and 
thereby deter some undesirable conduct. 




 Guidelines issued by the Justice Department set forth the 
circumstances under which it will prosecute a patent infringement 
action as unlawful monopolization.87  Somewhat inconsistently, 
those Guidelines provide that "Enforcement of a patent obtained by 
mere inequitable conduct before the Patent and Trademark Office, 
however, cannot be the basis of a section 2 claim, because 
inequitable conduct does not involve knowing and willful patent 
fraud" but also that "An objectively baseless infringement action, 
brought in bad faith, when the complainant knows the intellectual 
property right to be invalid, may violate section 2 of the Sherman 
Act."88  As indicated earlier, we believe that the second of these 
propositions is the more accurate statement of the law. 
 
Antitrust Challenge as Compulsory or Permissive Counterclaim; 




In most cases the antitrust challenge to an infringement action is 
presented as a counterclaim to the infringement suit itself.  If such 
counterclaims are classified as "compulsory" they must be brought 
as counterclaims or will be barred by principles of res judicata.  If, 
however, the antitrust counterclaim is permissive then failure to bring 
it will not preclude a subsequent and independent antitrust challenge 
to the infringement action.89 
                                                 
     87See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual 
Property '6.0 (1995), reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 41,339.  These Guidelines are 
reprinted as Appendix C to the Supplement. 
     88Id. at '6. 
     89See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), which states in relevant part: 
 
 A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of 
serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it 
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the 
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
 
See 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice & 
Procedure '1417 (Civ. 2d 1990 & 2008 Supp.); Michael D. Conway, Comment, 
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 The trend is to find such counterclaims to be compulsory and 
thus barred if not timely brought during the pendency of the 
infringement suit.  The Second Circuit's Critical-Vac decision 
distinguished between antitrust counterclaims to the infringement 
suit, which should be treated as compulsory, from claims and 
defenses of patent misuse, which might be treated as permissive.90  
The Supreme Court's controversial Mercoid decision91 had treated 
the latter as permissive, and the Second Circuit felt obliged to 
reconcile it with emergent doctrine holding that antitrust 
counterclaims to infringement actions are best regarded as 
compulsory.   It reasoned: 
 
 Antitrust claims based on patent misuse, such as the 
counterclaims in Mercoid, are likely to involve factual issues 
distinct from those involved in patent infringement litigation 
                                                                                                                            
Narrowing the Scope of Rule 13(A), 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 141, 156 (1993). 
 
 On related procedural issues see  Arthrocare Corp. v. Smith & Nephew, 
Inc., 406 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (refusing to dismiss antitrust counterclaim until 
antitrust plaintiff could respond on baselessness issue); Donnelly Corp. v. Reitter & 
Schefenacker, USA, 2002 WL 31418042, 2002-2 Trade Cas. &73,817 WD. Mich. 
Aug. 13, 2002) (granting infringement plaintiff's request to bifurcate trial of 
infringement claim and patent counterclaim; but not to stay discovery on the 
counterclaim; permitting all discovery to go forward would prevent discovery 
disputes and facilitate settlement). 
     90Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Int=l, Inc., 233 F.3d 697 (2d Cir. 
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1019 (2001).  See also Eon Labs, Inc. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D. Mass. 2003) (antitrust challenge to 
patent infringement suit is compulsory counterclaim; following Critical-Vac); Jarrow 
Formulas v. International Nutrition Co., 175 F.Supp. 2d 296 (D. Conn. 2001) 
(distinguishing Critical-Vac decision discussed in the main text: where some of the 
facts supporting the antitrust claim occurred after resolution of prior patent 
infringement suit, the antitrust claim could not be treated as a compulsory 
counterclaim to that prior suit).  Cf. Xerox Corp. v SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1061 
(3d Cir. 1978) (antitrust counterclaim not compulsory as to large antitrust suit 
challenging many aspects of defendant's conduct).  But when the underlying claim 
is simply for infringement and the basic defense to the infringement action is 
essentially the same as the counterclaim, the latter is compulsory.  Accord 
Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892, 898 (2d Cir. 1970); United Artists Corp. v. 
Masterpiece Prods., Inc.., 221 F.2d 213, 216 (2d Cir. 1955).  See 6 Wright, Miller & 
Kane, note 89 at ''1411-1412. 
     91Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). 
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between the same parties...  In contrast, antitrust claims 
based on patent invalidity, such as C-Vac's claims in the 
instant case, will generally involve the same factual issues as 
those involved in patent infringement litigation between the 
same parties....92 
 
 This reasoning is not entirely persuasive.  Some misuse 
claims raise precisely the same issues as arise in an antitrust claim 
and all necessary facts are known to the infringement defendant at 
the time of the infringement suit.  For example, perhaps the 
infringement plaintiff requires the defendant to use tied, staple 
commodities with the patent and its failure to do so forms the basis 
for the infringement claim.93  In such cases there is no reason not to 
make the antitrust counterclaim compulsory.  In other cases -- such 
as when the patent is procured by fraud but the facts are not 
revealed until after the infringement suit has run its course -- justice 
is poorly served by a rule that prevents a subsequent antitrust 
challenge.94 
 
 When the facts supporting the antitrust counterclaim are the 
same as those supporting the infringement defense, a compulsory 
counterclaim rule economizes on judicial resources and tends toward 
the efficient resolution of disputes.  For example, if the defense is 
that the theory of infringement is legally frivolous, the patent is clearly 
invalid or has expired, or the defendant's technology is obviously not 
infringing, then many of the facts necessary to support the antitrust 
counterclaim are implicit in the defense itself.  Other facts, such as 
market power or the dangerous probability of success in achieving it 
can be developed through discovery. 
 
 Making antitrust counterclaims compulsory is less sensible, 
however, when the facts needed to support the counterclaim are not 
sufficiently known at the time the infringement action is brought.  In 
such cases a compulsory counterclaim rule requires the infringement 
defendant to bring an antitrust claim that would be treated as 
                                                 
     92Critical-Vac, 223 F.3d at 703.  See also USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, 
Inc.102 F.R.D. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (making the same distinction). 
     93See 10 Antitrust Law &1781b,d. 
     94For fuller treatment, see Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 40 at '5.5. 
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unfounded or even frivolous if brought through the usual process.  
The outcome is particularly serious if the facts needed to support the 
antitrust counterclaim are not known until after the filing deadline for 
counterclaims has passed or, worse yet, after the trial is over.95 
 
 As a result, some allowance must be given to an infringement 
defendant forced to file its antitrust counterclaim before the full facts 
or the full impact of any antitrust violation is known.  For example, it 
would be perverse to hold that an antitrust claim is compulsory and 
thus cannot be brought later, but also that the infringement 
defendant lacks standing to bring the antitrust counterclaim because 
it has not yet perfected entry into the market.96 
 
"Affirmative" use of Walker Process: suits under Declaratory 
Judgment Act or direct Sherman Act suits 
 
 A counterclaim naturally presupposes an underlying 
infringement claim to which it is attached.  If the owner of an 
improperly obtained patent institutes enforcement actions falling 
short of an infringement suit, then the target's only recourse may be 
to institute their own action.  The Declaratory Judgment Act97 
                                                 
     95See American Packaging Corp. v. Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc., 
1995 WL 262522, 1995-1 Trade Cas. &71,009 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (infringement 
defendant claimed that information about fraudulent procurement of patent 
became available only very late in the infringement suit); see also Hydranautics, 
note 49, 204 F.3d at 886 (infringement defendant properly pled that infringement 
plaintiff committed perjury at infringement trial and that in absence of perjured 
testimony it would have lacked probable cause to pursue infringement action). 
 
 If new facts emerge after the litigation or if the infringement plaintiff 
committed fraud or other misconduct, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60b1 
permits the judge to give a party relief from the judgment provided that motion is 
made within a reasonable time, or within one year after entry of judgment. 
     96Cf. Amgen, Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche LTD, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75766 
(D.Mass. March 30, 2007) (rival who was target of patent infringement actions had 
standing to assert counterclaim even though it was not yet producing in the 
market, where FDA approval was "imminent" -- better rule here, if the infringement 
defendant is close enough to entry that a patent infringement suit or threat of it is 
forthcoming, then it has standing to maintain the antitrust action; further, expenses 
of litigating the patent could constitute "antitrust injury"). 
     9728 U.S.C. '2201.  What we say here is not intended to be a 
comprehensive treatment of Declaratory Judgment actions in this legal setting.  
For that, see 10B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal 
34 Hovenkamp, Walker Process August, 2008 
contemplates such actions,98 and some courts have permitted a 
direct antitrust challenge under the Sherman Act. 
 
 For example, in Unitherm that patentee wrote threatening 
letters to numerous firms, including customers of the challenger.99  
The claimant brought a Declaratory Judgment action asserting 
Walker Process-like claims, and the Federal Circuit concluded that a 
plaintiff in the claimant's position "may bring a Declaratory Judgment 
Action of patent invalidity ... even in the absence of overt 
enforcement actions.100  The Federal Circuit observed that merely 
obtaining a patent whose claims conflicted with the technology of the 
Declaratory Judgment plaintiff would be insufficient to raise the type 
of threat of harm that the Declaratory Judgment Act contemplated.  
However, threatening communications, even if not directed at the 
claimant itself, could be sufficient.  Just as the mere obtaining of a 
patent, with no subsequent enforcement activity, would not violate 
Walker Process, so too it would not give rise to a Declaratory 
Judgment action.101 
 
 In Hydril the Federal Circuit went one step further, holding that 
a firm could file a Sherman Act lawsuit directly against a patentee 
who had threatened the antitrust plaintiff's customers and supplier 
after widely publicizing its patent in the market, even though it knew 
that the patent was invalidated by prior art.102  The Federal Circuit 
                                                                                                                            
Practice and Procedure, '2751-2759 (Civ. 3d 2007). 
     98See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2007), holding 
that a licensee did not need to repudiate its license agreement as a condition of 
having a "case or controversy" sufficient to invoke the Declaratory Judgment Act. 
     99Unitherm, note 20. 
     100Id., 375 F.3d at 1358.  See also Highway Equipment Co., Inc. v. Cives 
Corp., 476 F.Supp.2d 1079 (N.D.Ia. 2007). 
     101See, e.g., Microchip Technology Inc. v. The Chamberlain Group, 441 F.3d 
936 (Fed.Cir.2006) (no jurisdiction under Declaratory Judgment Act when DJ 
plaintiff did not face reasonable apprehension of suit). 
     102Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
Contrast Merchandising Technologies, Inc. v. Telefonix, Inc., 2007-1 Trade Cas. 
&75598 (D.Ore. Feb. 7, 2007) (minimum degree of enforcement necessary to 
support Walker Process claim is that needed to establish actual controversy for 
purposes of declaratory judgment act; here not even enough controversy to 
establish that; in fact, the patentee had simply sent out to its customers a notice of 
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rejected the district court's conclusion that an affirmative claim would 
lie only if the patentee's enforcement action lay against the antitrust 
claimant itself, as would normally be the case in a Declaratory 
Judgment Action.  The court observed: 
 
 To the extent the district court's ruling may have been based 
on Hydril's failure to allege threatened enforcement action 
against Hydril rather than against its customers, a valid 
Walker Process claim may be based upon enforcement 
activity directed against the plaintiff's customers. Threats of 
patent litigation against customers, based on a fraudulently-
procured patent, with a reasonable likelihood that such threats 
will cause the customers to cease dealing with their supplier, 
is the kind of economic coercion that the antitrust laws are 
intended to prevent. A supplier may be equally injured if it 
loses its share of the market because its customers stop 
dealing with it than if its competitor directs its monopolistic 
endeavors against the supplier itself. Without customers, a 
supplier has no business.103 
                                                                                                                            
the existence of its patent). 
 
 Of course, consumers as well as competitors can bring direct actions.  See 
Netflix Antitrust Litigation, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75749 (N.D.Cal. June 14, 2007) 
(consumers had standing to challenge alleged Walker Process violation; ultimately 
deciding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim; allegations were merely that 
Netflix obtained its patents fraudulently; plaintiffs could not show that any rival was 
actually excluded by the patents); Molecular Diagnostics Labs. v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (D.D.C. 2005) (purchasers have standing).  
Cf. DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75726 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006) (odd, apparently incorrect alternative holding that direct 
purchasers of drug lacked standing to assert Walker Process claim alleging that 
defendant used improperly procured patent to keep generics off market resulting in 
higher prices for its own drug; court holds that because Walker Process is founded 
in patent, only infringement defendant/competitor has standing to assert it; but if '2 
is violated and results in higher prices, consumers are clearly appropriate 
plaintiffs).    The language from Walker Process that the DDAVP court cites states 
only that enforcement of a fraudulently obtained patent is exclusionary vis-a-vis the 
competitor/infringement defendant; but all exclusionary practices fit into that 
classification). 
     103Id. at 1350.  On remand the district court dismissed the complaint once 
again, declaring mainly that the plaintiff lacked standing because it had shown 
insufficient intent and preparedness to enter the market covered by the patent.  
Hydril Co. v. Grant Prideco, L.P., 2007-2 Trade Cas. &75769 (S.D.Tx. June 19, 
2007). 
 




 The antitrust violation for an improper infringement suit 
presupposes that the patent in question is either invalid or 
unenforceable, or else that the infringement defendant's technology 
does not infringe.  As a result, remedies such as compulsory 
licensing are generally inapt.  No one needs a license to copy the 
technology described in an invalid patent; nor does the person 
whose technology does not infringe.  At the very least, antitrust 
remedies can include an injunction against future, similar conduct.  
But in most cases such a remedy would not be of much value. 
 
 Probably the most appropriate remedy is damages to the 
infringement defendant (or potential infringement defendants) whose 
entry, growth, or sales have been stifled by the infringement plaintiff's 
wrongful conduct.  Currently the circuit courts are divided on the 
question whether the costs of defending a wrongfully brought 
infringement action subsequently found to be an antitrust violation 
are recoverable as antitrust damages.104 
 
 On principle, the cases permitting such damages seem 
correct.  Infringement suits are designed to raise the entry costs of 
rivals, and clearly the cost of defending such suits is part of the 
"cost" of entry.  Further, of all the damages suffered by such plaintiffs 
-- loss of sales, loss of market share, loss of prospective entry 
opportunities -- the costs of litigating the infringement suit are by far 
the most certain and easy to measure. 
                                                                                                                            
 On Hydril, see Christopher R. Leslie, New Possibilities for Asserting 
Walker Process Claims, 21 Antitrust 48 (Summer, 2007). 
     104See Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 882-883 (2d Cir. 1971), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972) (denying such recovery); Premier Elec. Constr. 
Co. v. Nat'l Elec. Contractors Assn., 814 F.2d 358, 371-372 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(permitting it); Handgards II, note 72, 743 F.2d at 1297-1298 (same); Kearney & 
Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, 562 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1977) (same); 
Am. Infra-Red Radiant Co. v. Lambert Indus., Inc., 360 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1966) (same); Hynix Semiconductor Inc. V. Rambus, Inc., 
527 F.Supp.2d 1084 (N.D.Cal. 2007); Marchoti Eyezvear v. Tura LP, 2002 WL 
31253199 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2002) (same); IGT v. Alliance Gaming Corp., 2007-1 
Trade Cas. &75687 (D.Nev. March 22, 2007) (same); Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. 
Mony Life Insurance Co., 2007-1 Trade Cas. &75705 (E.D.Wash. March 6, 2007) 
(same). 
August, 2008 Hovenkamp, Walker Process 37 
 
 Of course, damages need not be limited to the costs of 
defending the improper suit.  Such suits may also cause loss of 
sales, premature exit from the market, precluded entry, all of which 
invoke more traditional measures of damages. 
 
